CISA published advisory ICSMA-19-178-01 on June 27, 2019, covering a family of Medtronic MiniMed insulin pumps. The list runs from the MiniMed 508 and 511 through the 512/712, 515/715, 522/722, 522K/722K and 712E (all versions), the 523/723 and 523K/723K (2.4A and prior), the Veo 554/754 (2.6A and prior) and the Veo 554CM and 754CM (2.7A and prior).

CVE-2019-10964 (CWE-284) scores 7.1 under CVSS v3. The pumps talk over wireless RF to blood glucose meters, glucose sensor transmitters and CareLink USB devices, and that protocol does not properly implement authentication or authorization. An attacker with adjacent access can inject, replay, modify or intercept data, change pump settings and control insulin delivery.

Credit goes to two research teams: Nathanael Paul, Jay Radcliffe and Barnaby Jack, and Billy Rios, Jonathan Butts and Jesse Young, along with Medtronic. The attack complexity is rated high and the attacker must be within radio range, but the integrity and availability impacts are both high on a device that doses insulin.

A protocol cannot be retrofitted with authentication it never had, so Medtronic is not shipping a fix. It recommends that U.S. patients talk to their healthcare provider about changing to a newer pump with increased cybersecurity protection. Patients outside the U.S. receive a notification letter, and Medtronic is writing to all known users with the risks and defensive measures.

Until a patient switches, the remaining control is distance. The attack needs radio range, so the pump and its linked devices should stay with the patient.