CISA published advisory ICSMA-18-123-01 on May 3, 2018, covering three vulnerabilities in Philips Brilliance computed tomography systems. Affected are Brilliance 64 version 2.6.2 and prior, Brilliance CT Big Bore 2.3.5 and prior, and Brilliance iCT 3.2.4 and prior and 4.1.6 and prior. Philips reported the issues.
The scanners run user functions inside a contained kiosk on Microsoft Windows. CVE-2018-8853 (CWE-250, CVSS 6.1) says Windows boots by default with elevated privileges, so a kiosk application, a user or an attacker can pick up privileges they should not have. CVE-2018-8861 (CWE-668, CVSS 6.1) covers breaking out of the kiosk into the underlying operating system.
CVE-2018-8857 (CWE-798) is the highest at 8.4. The software contains fixed credentials, such as a password or cryptographic key, used for its own authentication, for outbound connections or to encrypt internal data. The vector needs local access but no privileges and no user interaction.
Together they let a limited kiosk user end up with Windows-level control. Per the advisory, that can mean running software and viewing or changing files that include PHI, directories or system configuration. Philips had received no reports of exploitation.
Philips remediated the hard-coded credentials in Brilliance iCT 4.x and above, and the iCT-iPatient (v4.x) Instructions for Use describe credential management. For the kiosk issues Philips is assessing remediation in future product introductions and upgrades across its CT and AMI modalities. The MX8000 Dual EXP, out of support since 2017, gets a replacement recommendation instead.
A kiosk shell on top of an admin-level Windows session is a curtain over the operating system. Run the clinical application as a least-privilege account so a breakout lands somewhere useless.