ICSMA-26-223-01 lists eight CVEs across the Mira Hormone Monitor and its Android companion app, both from Quanovate Tech. The worst of them, CVE-2026-68067 at CVSS v3.1 9.8, sat in the cloud API: the login endpoint accepted any string shaped like a password and handed back an active session token. An email address was the whole attack.

The second critical, CVE-2026-67568 at 9.1, is a set of hard-coded credentials shipped inside the distributed APK, good for read and write access to health profiles from any internet-connected host. The Bluetooth findings sit just underneath. CVE-2026-66875 (8.8) lets an unauthenticated attacker 10 to 30 meters away rebind the monitor, read hormone measurements in cleartext, and track the user passively. CVE-2026-67558 (7.4) exists because the Android app identified devices with a substring match, so a spoofed device captures the session token and injects forged measurements.

Quanovate ran two rounds of remediation. The fixed builds are iOS 3.5.18 and Android 4.5.18, with firmware 01.07.01.53 pushed automatically through the connected app. The research came from the Northeastern University SPQR Lab under HHS ARPA-H funding, credited to Gigi Xiaoqing Liu, Muzzammil Mohammed, Narmina Karimova, and En Mong.

Six of the eight CVEs live in the app or the cloud API rather than in the device. Manufacturers still scoping security work around the physical product keep rediscovering that most of their auditable attack surface moved to the backend years ago.