French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot said November 9 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is responsible for a wave of cyberattacks that hit refrigeration and freezer controllers at grocery stores, supermarkets and blood banks across France and the rest of Europe. Responsibility for this act lies with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Barrot said, calling it an attack of unprecedented scale and aggression.
The campaign ran in two waves between October and early November, striking thousands of internet connected refrigeration units, according to Reuters reporting cited by TechCrunch. MedDevice Cyber covered one target directly on November 2: three cold storage sites run by France's national blood service, EFS, where attackers pushed temperature and defrost thresholds on plasma storage units as high as 110 degrees Celsius overnight on November 1 and 2. EFS said at the time that no plasma was lost and that the attacks were stopped before any blood spoiled. The French government's attribution now ties that incident to the broader campaign.
Security researchers told TechCrunch that the web based controllers behind the attacks are vulnerable to remote hacks, and that some of the affected models, made by Danish manufacturer Danfoss, no longer receive security fixes. Neither outlet named a CVE or a specific model number, and Danfoss had not published a public advisory as of November 10.
France has summoned Iran's ambassador, said it will push for European Union wide sanctions against those responsible, and referred the matter to its justice system. Barrot's statement is the first time a national government has formally attributed the refrigeration campaign to a specific state actor rather than describing it as the work of unnamed hacktivists.
U.S. officials have separately linked the freezer campaign, and a parallel wave of attacks on American water utilities, to pro-Iranian hacktivists acting on Tehran's behalf, reportedly in response to the U.S.-Israel led war against Iran earlier this year. TechCrunch's report places the campaign alongside other 2026 intrusions attributed to Iran, including the disruptive attack on Stryker, though it does not describe the method used against the device maker.
For device manufacturers and hospital systems, what matters now is the access path: a remotely reachable, unpatched web management interface on cold chain equipment that stores plasma, reagents and temperature sensitive drugs is a demonstrated target for a state linked actor. Facilities that rely on third party remote maintenance for refrigeration, as EFS did, should treat vendor remote access as a segmented, logged and revocable connection rather than a standing trust relationship.